Shopify began delisting storefront apps that don't declare a server allowlist, the first hard cutoff in a security program it has tightened for weeks. It also made two-factor login mandatory for app developers. The Bytecode Alliance patched a bug that let sandboxed code on Windows escape its sandbox and reach the host's files in Wasmtime, the engine many products embed to run customers' plugins. The W3C's Web Incubator Community Group gave agent-driven browser control its own repository. Standard Webhooks, the cross-vendor convention for signing webhooks, cut its first release that ships every language library together.
Marketplace security: Shopify started removing apps that don't declare a server allowlist
Shopify began delisting storefront apps that don't declare a server allowlist, and made two-factor login mandatory for app developers. Shopify is a large hosting platform for online stores, and the apps in its App Store run on their developers' own servers, where Shopify never sees the code. In a November 14 update ahead of its deadline, it confirmed that on November 20 any public app that has not declared the server addresses it runs from is removed from the App Store and blocked from new installs, while installs already in place keep working. The same update made two-factor authentication required on all partner accounts starting the following week, and widened the allowlist so an app can name individual addresses, address ranges, and its hosting provider's network blocks together. Earlier pieces of the package that Shopify set out on October 27 warned developers or let them test against the rules; this is the first to remove apps.
Why it matters: both changes limit the damage from a compromise. A stolen app credential now works only from the servers the app declared, so an attacker cannot use it to pull store data out to a machine of their own. Mandatory two-factor login protects the developer account whose takeover would let an attacker push a malicious update to every merchant that installed the app.
Infrastructure: the Bytecode Alliance patched a filesystem sandbox escape in Wasmtime
The Bytecode Alliance patched a bug that let sandboxed code on Windows read and write
files outside its sandbox in Wasmtime, the engine many products embed to run code their
customers supply. On
November 19 the Alliance disclosed and fixed a high-severity flaw:
a guest given access to a single directory could reach any file the host process could
read or write, on any drive, because the engine mis-read a Windows drive-prefixed path
component such as C:foo as a drive-relative path. It shipped the fix the same day across
the four release lines it still supports. Three days earlier, on
November 16, it had patched a separate set of bugs
that let a sandboxed program crash its host or drive the host's memory up without limit.
Why it matters: when a product lets customers run their own code, the sandbox boundary is the entire safety guarantee. A guest that can crash its host breaks availability; a guest that can read and write the host's files breaks the boundary itself, which is the one thing a sandbox exists to prevent.
Web standards: W3C's incubator opens the Agentic WebDriver BiDi repository for agent-driven browser control
The W3C's Web Incubator Community Group opened a dedicated repository, Agentic WebDriver BiDi, to work out standard ways for an AI agent to drive a web browser under supervision. The last issue noted this as an early, single-author proposal. On November 17 it moved from a discussion thread into its own repository, after contributors from Google and Mozilla agreed on the approach and where to develop it. The work extends WebDriver BiDi, the standard protocol for automating a browser, so an agent operates under supervised sessions: limited to permitted actions, told when the person takes back control, and able to have individual permissions paused without being cut off.
Why it matters: agent-driven browser control becomes a cross-browser standard only if the browser engines agree on how it works before any single vendor ships its own version. Contributors from Google and Mozilla converging this early on a shared supervision model, where the agent is confined to permitted actions and the person can take control back, is what keeps it from fragmenting into separate, per-browser automation APIs.
Webhooks: Standard Webhooks shipped its first unified release
Standard Webhooks shipped its first release that puts every language library on a single shared version number. It also added a signing method built for the dedicated security hardware some companies require. Standard Webhooks is the cross-vendor convention, used by OpenAI, Anthropic, and Twilio among others, for formatting and signing the automated messages one service sends another when an event happens. The November 17 release is the first to carry one version number across every language library and to define a formal slot for optional extensions, and it ships the handshake, merged in late October, that lets a sender confirm an address actually agreed to receive its events. It also added a signing scheme that fixes limits in the earlier design, which made it hard to sign larger payloads or keep a separate signing key per destination.
Why it matters: a shared, verifiable way to sign these messages lets a customer who receives events from many vendors check each one the same way, instead of handling every sender's scheme separately. The hardware-oriented option extends that to companies with stricter rules about how signing keys are stored.
Also worth knowing
- Roblox added rendering controls that creators can script. Its weekly release 748 on November 17 gave the engine color-grading lookup tables and controls over how each light falls off, both of which a creator can set from a script.
- A developer proposed letting a website block browser extensions from changing its pages. In the W3C's Web Incubator Community Group, an individual contributor proposed on November 19 an opt-in by which a site could declare which extensions may read or alter its content, meant to close a path where a malicious extension abuses a trusted one. It has no browser backing yet.
- MCP merged its Events Extension and added it to the published extensions list. It lets an agent subscribe to events in an outside system, such as a Slack message, a repository push, or a PagerDuty incident, and act on them without the user present. After accepting it earlier in November, MCP's maintainers merged the spec text on November 19 and registered the extension on November 20. Its webhook delivery mode is signed using Standard Webhooks, the convention covered above.
On the radar
- November 30: The WebAssembly Community Group holds its next call.
- December 1: New Microsoft 365 Copilot Business licenses switch to usage-based billing by default, and Copilot becomes purchasable without a qualifying base subscription.
- December 10: Atlassian Forge begins rejecting older, non-SHA256 file checksums.
- December 18: Atlassian Forge stops forwarding Forge apps' old full-page addresses.
- December 31: Cloudflare ends bug and security fixes for the 0.x line of its Sandbox SDK.
- January 1, 2027: Shopify begins requiring a declared server list for existing installs of custom apps used outside the developer's own organization.
- January 5, 2027: Brave is expected to turn on WebMCP support by default in its Leo assistant.
- March 30, 2027: MCP ships its next spec release under its new fixed calendar.
This Week in Extensibility is curated by Todd Schiller. Research, drafting, and fact checking are AI-assisted.